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Abstract
Judea Pearl (2000) was the first to propose a definition of actual causation using causal models.
A number of authors have suggested that an adequate account of actual causation must appeal not
only to causal structure, but also to considerations of normality. In (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2011),
we offer a definition of actual causation using extended causal models, which include information
about both causal structure and normality. Extended causal models are potentially very complex.
In this paper, we show how it is possible to achieve a compact representation of extended causal
models.
1 Introduction
One of Judea Pearl’s many, many important contributions to the study of causality was the first attempt
to use the mathematical tools of causal modeling to give an account of “actual causation”, a notion
that has been of considerable interest among philosophers and legal theorists (Pearl, 2000, Chapter 10).
Pearl later revised his account of actual causation in joint work with Halpern (Halpern & Pearl, 2005).
A number of authors (Hall, 2007; Halpern, 2008; Hitchcock, 2007; Menzies, 2004) have suggested that
an account of actual causation must be sensitive to considerations of normality, as well as to causal
structure. In (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2011), we suggest a way of incorporating considerations of nor-
mality into the Halpern-Pearl theory, and show how to extend the account to illuminate features of the
psychology of causal judgment, as well as features of causal reasoning in the law. Our account of actual
causation makes use of “extended causal models”, which include both structural equations among a set
of variables, and a partial preorder on possible worlds, which represents the relative “normality” of those
worlds.
We actually want to think of people as working with the structural equations and normality order
to evaluate actual causation. However, consideration of even simple examples immediately suggests a
problem. A direct representation of the equations and normality order is too cumbersome for cognitively
limited agents to use effectively. If our account of actual causation is to be at all realistic as a model of
human causal judgment, some form of compact representation will be needed.
∗Supported in part by NSF grants IIS-0812045 and IIS-0911036, AFOSR grants FA9550-08-1-0438 and AFOSR grants
FA9550-08-1-0438 and FA9550-05-1-0055, and ARO grant W911NF-09-1-0281.
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To understand the problem, consider a doctor trying to deal with a patient who has just come in
reporting bad headaches. Let’s keep things simple, and suppose that the doctor considers only a small
number of variables that might be relevant: stress, constriction of blood vessels in the brain, aspirin
consumption, and trauma to the head. Again, keeping things simple, assume that each of these variables
(including headaches) is binary; that is, has only two possible values. So, for example, the patient
either has a headache or not. Each variable may depend upon the value of the other four. To represent
that structural equation for the variable “headaches”, a causal model will need to assign a value to
“headache” for each of the sixteen possible values of the other four variables. That means that there are
216—over 60,000!—possible equations for “headaches”. Considering all five variables, there are 280
(over 1024) possible sets of equations. Representing one of these would require eighty binary bits of
information. Now consider the normality orders. With five binary variables, there are 25 = 32 possible
assignments of values to these variables. Think of each of these assignments as a “possible world”.
There are 32! (roughly 2.6 × 1035) strict orders of these 32 worlds, and many more if we allow for
ties or incomparable worlds. Altogether, the doctor would need to store close to two hundred bits of
information just to represent this simple extended causal model.
Now suppose we consider a more realistic model with 50 random variables. Then the same argu-
ments show that we would need as many as 250×249 possible sets of equations, 250 possible worlds, and
over 250×250 normality orders (in general, with n binary variables, there are 2n2n−1 sets of equations, 2n
possible worlds, and (2n)! ∼ 2n2n strict orders). Thus, with 50 variables, roughly 50 × 250 bits would
be needed to representing a causal model. This is clearly cognitively unrealistic.
The goal of this paper is to show that, in practice, representing the information needed to evaluate
actual causation can be done in a reasonably compact way, so that the assumption that people are actually
doing this is indeed psychologically plausible. To do this, we will make significant use of another of
Pearl’s signal contributions: the use of directed graphs—specifically, Bayesian networks—to represent
independence relations (Pearl, 1988).
The first step towards the goal of getting a compact representation comes from the observation that
similar representational difficulties arise when it comes to reasoning about probability. For example,
if the doctor would like to reason probabilistically about the symptoms, just describing a probability
distribution on the 250 worlds would also require 250 (or, more precisely, 250 − 1) numbers. Bayesian
networks allow us to typically get much more compact representations of probability distributions by
taking advantage of (conditional) independencies.
Our goal is to arrive at an analogue of a Bayesian network representation for both the structural
equations and for normality. For the structural equations, it is easy to see where independence comes
in. If the equation for each variable X depends on the values of only a few other variables, then the
structural equations become much easier to represent. Normality is not typically represented using prob-
ability; in (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2011), we represented it using a partial preorder; in (Halpern, 2008;
Halpern & Pearl, 2005; Huber, 2011) it is represented using a ranking function (Spohn, 1988). Both
of these approaches are instances of what has been called a plausibility measure (Friedman & Halpern,
1995). Halpern (2001) has given conditions under which plausibility measures can be represented us-
ing Bayesian networks; we apply these ideas here. This allows us to take advantage of conditional
independencies to get a compact representation of the normality order, though it is not described proba-
bilistically.
We believe that even greater representational economy may often be possible. This is because we
expect that the normality order will often be largely determined by the causal structure. For example,
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suppose that the causal structure is such that if the patient suffers a head trauma, then he would also
suffer from headaches. Then we would expect any world where trauma = 1 and headaches = 1 to be
more normal, all else being equal, than a world in which trauma = 1 and headaches = 0. In this way, a
representation of causal structure can do “double duty” by representing much of the normality order as
well.
An obvious question is whether the normality order induced by the causal structure accurately rep-
resents normality. This may not always be the case. In Section 5, we discuss some examples where we
might want to have a normality order that does not conform to causal structure in this way. Nevertheless,
we would expect that the normality order is largely determined by the equations. Thus, we can get a
more compact representation of the normality order by just listing the exceptions to the order generated
by the equations.
Interestingly, Huber (2011) has suggested an alternative approach to representing causality and nor-
mality; rather than using the causal structure to (largely) determine the normality order, we can use the
normality order to determine the causal structure. We discuss this possibility in more detail in Section 5.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the basic definitions needed to
understand (extended) causal models. In Section 3, we discuss how compact representations of extended
causal models can be obtained; this is the technical core of the paper. In Section 4, we discuss how we
can (typically) get a yet more compact representation by assuming that, by default, it is typical for the
variables to obey the structural equations. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss Huber’s proposal of using
the normality order to represent causality.
2 Extended Causal Models
Our motivation for extending causal models to incorporate a notion of normality is to address some
difficulties facing the Halpern-Pearl definition of actual cause (Halpern & Pearl, 2005) and to extend
it in various ways. We develop the extended account in detail in (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2011). The
Halpern-Pearl approach has been criticized (as have all other approaches to causality!). It is beyond the
scope of this paper to defend it. In fact, as we shall see, nothing in the present paper depends upon the
details of the Halpern-Pearl definition. Our approach to compactly representing extended causal models
can be applied to any framework that combines causal models with a normality ordering. In particular,
it should be applicable to alternative accounts of actual causation such as (Hall, 2007).
In this section, we briefly review extended causal models. We encourage the reader to consult
(Halpern & Pearl, 2005; Halpern & Hitchcock, 2011) for more details and motivation. Extended causal
models are based on causal models, so we start with a review of causal models.
2.1 Causal Models
The description of causal models given here is taken from (Halpern, 2000); it is a formalization of earlier
work of Pearl (1995), further developed in (Galles & Pearl, 1997; Halpern, 2000; Pearl, 2000).
The model assumes that the world is described in terms of random variables and their values. For
example, if we are trying to determine whether a forest fire was caused by lightning or an arsonist, we
can take the world to be described by three random variables:
• FF for forest fire, where FF = 1 if there is a forest fire and FF = 0 otherwise;
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• L for lightning, where L = 1 if lightning occurred and L = 0 otherwise;
• M for match dropped (by arsonist), where M = 1 if the arsonist dropped a lit match, and M = 0
otherwise.
Similarly, in an election between Mr. B and Mr. G with 11 voters, we can describe the world by 12
random variables, V1, . . . , V11,W , where Vi = 0 if voter i voted for Mr. B and V1 = 1 if voter i voted
for Mr. G, for i = 1, . . . , 11, W = 0 if Mr. B wins, and W = 1 if Mr. G wins.
In these two examples, all the random variables are binary; that is, they take on only two values.
There is no problem allowing a random variable to have more than two possible values. For example,
the random variable Vi could be either 0, 1, or 2, where Vi = 2 if i does not vote; similarly, we could
take W = 2 if the vote is tied, so neither candidate wins.
Some random variables may have a causal influence on others. This influence is modeled by a set
of structural equations. For example, if we want to model the fact that if the arsonist drops a match
or lightning strikes then a fire starts, we could use the random variables M , FF , and L as above, with
the equation FF = max(L,M ); that is, the value of the random variable FF is the maximum of the
values of the random variables M and L. This equation says, among other things, that if M = 0 and
L = 1, then FF = 1. The equality sign in this equation should be thought of more like an assignment
statement in programming languages; once we set the values of M and L, then the value of FF is set to
their maximum. However, despite the equality, if a forest fire starts some other way, that does not force
the value of either M or L to be 1. That is, setting FF to 1 does not result in either M or L being set to
1.
Alternatively, if we want to model the fact that a fire requires both a lightning strike and a dropped
match (perhaps the wood is so wet that it needs two sources of fire to get going), then the only change
in the model is that the equation for FF becomes FF = min(L,M ); the value of FF is the minimum
of the values of M and L. The only way that FF = 1 is if both L = 1 and M = 1.
It is conceptually useful to split the random variables into two sets: the exogenous variables, whose
values are determined by factors outside the model, and the endogenous variables, whose values are
ultimately determined by the exogenous variables. In the forest-fire example, the variables M , L, and
FF are endogenous. We do not want to concern ourselves with the factors that make the arsonist drop
the match or the factors that cause lightning. Thus we do not include endogenous variables for these
factors. Instead, we introduce a single exogenous variable U whose values take the form (i, j), where i
and j each take the value zero or one. The value of U will then determine the values of M and L.1
Formally, a causal model M is a pair (S,F), where S is a signature, which explicitly lists the
endogenous and exogenous variables and characterizes their possible values, and F defines a set of
modifiable structural equations, relating the values of the variables. A signature S is a tuple (U ,V,R),
where U is a set of exogenous variables, V is a set of endogenous variables, and R associates with
every variable Y ∈ U ∪ V a nonempty setR(Y ) of possible values for Y (that is, the set of values over
which Y ranges). As suggested above, in the forest-fire example, we have U = {U}, where U is the
exogenous variable,R(U) consists of the four possible values of U discussed earlier, V = {FF , L,M },
andR(FF ) = R(L) = R(M ) = {0, 1}.
1Note that U will not typically be a “common cause” in the usual sense. It represents a variety of different factors which
need not be correlated. Thus, we do not expect U to induce a correlation between M and L.
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F associates with each endogenous variable X ∈ V a function denoted FX such that
FX : (×U∈UR(U))× (×Y ∈V−{X}R(Y ))→ R(X).
This mathematical notation just makes precise the fact that FX determines the value of X , given the
values of all the other variables in U ∪ V . If there is one exogenous variable U and three endogenous
variables, X , Y , and Z, then FX defines the values of X in terms of the values of Y , Z, and U . For
example, we might have FX(u, y, z) = u+ y, which is usually written as X = U +Y .2 Thus, if Y = 3
and U = 2, then X = 5, regardless of how Z is set.
In the running forest-fire example, where U has four possible values of the form (i, j), the i value
determines the value of L and the j value determines the value of M . Although FL gets as arguments
the values of U , M , and FF , in fact, it depends only on the (first component of the) value of U ; that is,
FL((i, j),m, f) = i. Similarly, FM ((i, j), l, f) = j. In this model, the value of FF depends only on
the value of L and M . How it depends on them depends on whether we are considering the conjunctive
model or the disjunctive model.
A possible world is an assignment of values to all the endogenous random variables in a causal
model. We might use the term “small world” to describe such an assignment, to distinguish it from a
“large world”, which is an assignment of values to all of the variables in a causal model, both endogenous
and exogenous.
In other applications, we may well need to make use of such “large worlds”. In the present paper,
however, we need to use only small worlds.3 Hence, in this paper, “possible world” and “world” should
be understood as referring to such “small worlds”. Intuitively, a possible world is a maximally specific
description of a situation within the language allowed by the set of endogenous variables. Thus, a world
in the forest-fire example might be one where M = 1, L = 0, and FF = 0; the match is dropped, there
is no lightning, and no forest fire. As this example shows, a possible world does not have to satisfy the
equations of the causal model.
A causal model M is acyclic if its equations are such that there is no sequence of variables X1,
X2, . . . , Xn where X2 depends nontrivially on X1, . . . , Xn depends non-trivially on Xn−1, and X1
depends non-trivially onXn. In an acyclic causal model, a complete specification ~U = ~u of the value(s)
of the exogenous variable(s), called a context, uniquely determines the values of all of the endogenous
variables. In other worlds, given an acyclic causal model M , the choice of a context ~u suffices to
determine a possible world. If the variableX takes the value x in this possible world, we write (M,~u) |=
X = x. In the sequel, we consider only acyclic causal models; these seem to be rich enough to deal with
essentially all the examples of causality that have been considered in the literature (c.f., the discussion
in (Halpern & Pearl, 2005)).
Structural equations do more than just constrain the possible values of the variables in a causal
model. They also determine what happens in the presence of external interventions. For example,
we can explain what would happen if one were to intervene to prevent the arsonist from dropping the
match. In the disjunctive model, there is a forest fire exactly if there is lightning; in the conjunctive
model, there is definitely no fire. An “intervention” does not necessarily imply human agency. The idea
2Again, the fact that X is assigned U + Y (i.e., the value of X is the sum of the values of U and Y ) does not imply that Y
is assigned X − U ; that is, FY (U,X,Z) = X − U does not necessarily hold.
3This is because the definition of actual causation in (Halpern & Pearl, 2005) involves worlds generated by performing
interventions on a causal model in a fixed context (set of values of the exogenous variables). Thus, we need to compare only
worlds where the values of exogenous variables are fixed—that is, we are effectively comparing small worlds.
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is rather that some independent process overrides the existing causal structure to determine the value
of one or more variables, regardless of the value of its (or their) usual causes. Woodward (2003) gives
a detailed account of such interventions. Setting the value of some endogenous variable X to x in a
causal model M = (S,F) by means of an intervention results in a new causal model denoted MX=x.
MX=x is identical to M , except that the equation for X in F is replaced by X = x. Given a context
~u, (MX=x, ~u) may be thought of as the possible world that would result from intervening to set the
variable X to the value x. It is this ability to represent the effects of interventions on the system that
give a causal model its distinctively “causal” character.
If there are distinct values x, x′ of X , and y, y′ of Y such that (MX=x, ~u) |= Y = y and
(MX=x′ , ~u) |= Y = y′, then we say that Y counterfactually depends on X in (M,~u). Intuitively,
this means that intervening on the value of X can make a difference for the value of Y .
We regard a causal model as representing objective features of the world. More precisely, given a
choice of endogenous and exogenous variables, there is a correct choice of functions to represent the
causal dependence of the variables upon one another. The correctness of a causal model can be tested,
at least in principle, by performing the relevant interventions on the values of the variables.
2.2 Actual Causation
One relation that has attracted considerable attention, especially in philosophy and legal theory, is actual
causation. For example, the claim that the arsonist’s lighting his match caused the forest fire describes
a relation of actual causation. This claim is expressed after the fact, and it implies that the arsonist did
light his match, and that the forest fire occurred. In addition, it asserts that the lit match is among the
actual causes of the forest fire. Relations of actual causation cannot simply be “read off” a causal model.
Our model of the forest fire tells us what would happen if the arsonist lights his match, and if lightning
strikes, but it does not tell us whether either of these events would count as a cause of the fire. Actual
causation has been of interest, in part, because it seems to be involved in assessments of moral and legal
responsibility.
The full definition of actual causation offered in (Halpern & Pearl, 2005) is fairly complex, and most
of the details do not matter to the present discussion. It suffices to note that according to the Halpern-
Pearl definition, counterfactual dependence is sufficient for actual causation. More precisely, X = x is
an actual cause of Y = y in (M,~u) if (but not only if): (a) (M,~u) |= X = x, Y = y; and (b) there
exist x′ 6= x and y′ 6= y such that (MX=x′ , ~u) |= Y = y′. The new model MX=x′ , together with the
context ~u, determines a unique value for each of the endogenous variables. This assignment of values
determines a possible world, which is called a witness to X = x being an actual cause of Y = y.4
Counterfactual dependence is not necessary for actual causation, since counterfactual dependence can
fail in cases of preemption and overdetermination. But we can ignore these cases for now.
Halpern and Pearl (2005) already noted that a causal model does not suffice to determine causality.
There are subtle examples that can be characterized by causal models that are isomorphic, but the where
judgment of actual causation differs. One approach to solving these problems, suggested by Halpern
and Pearl (2005), and developed in different ways by Hall (2007), Halpern (2008), Hitchcock (2007),
and Halpern and Hitchcock (2011), is to incorporate considerations about about defaults, typicality, and
normality. “Normality” and its cognates (“normal”, “norm”, “abnormal”, etc.) tend to be ambiguous.
4Using the full Halpern-Pearl definition of actual causation, a witness world may also incorporate the results of additional
interventions besides the intervention on the candidate cause. See (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2011) for more details.
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They can refer to statistical frequency, as when we say that there has been more rain than normal for
this time of year. But they can also refer to prescriptive rules, as when we say that someone has violated
a moral norm. These concepts obviously differ in important ways, but in ordinary thought we often slip
between the two ideas without even realizing it. Our conjecture is that these two different senses of
“normality” affect causal judgments in roughly similar ways, so we have left the word deliberately am-
biguous. (We remark that there are other interpretations of normality as well; see (Halpern & Hitchcock,
2010) for further discussion.)
Here is a simple example to illustrate how considerations of normality can affect causal judgments:
Example 2.1: Professor Smith and an administrative assistant take the last two pens in the department
office. There is a department rule that administrative assistants are allowed to take the pens, while
faculty are not. Later, a problem arises from the lack of pens.
Knobe and Fraser (2008) presented subjects with a version of this vignette, and asked them to
rate their agreement with either the statement that Professor Smith caused the problem, or that the
administrative assistant caused the problem. Subjects were much more strongly inclined to agree that
Professor Smith caused the problem.
We can model this case as follows. (For simplicity, we ignore the exogenous variable(s).) Let
PS = 1 if Professor Smith takes a pen, PS = 0 if not; AA = 1 if the administrative assistant takes
a pen, AA = 0 if not; and PO = 1 if the problem occurs, PO = 0 if not. Then the equation for
PO will be PO = min(PS,AA). It should be apparent that the dependence of PO on PS and AA
is symmetric; in particular, PO counterfactually depends upon both variables. Nonetheless, judgments
about the two are different. Professor Smith violated a norm, while the administrative assistant did not,
and this difference seems to be affecting causal judgments about the case.
According to the theory of (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2011), potential causes are “graded” according
to the normality of their witnesses.5 In the pen vignette, the witness for PS = 1 being an actual cause
of PO = 1 is the world (PS = 0, AA = 1, PO = 0); the witness for AA = 1 being an actual cause is
(PS = 1, AA = 0, PO = 0). Since Professor Smith’s taking a pen violates a norm, the former world
is more normal, and PS = 1 receives a higher causal grading.
This kind of treatment can be extended to a wide range of cases. For example, we can make the
familiar distinction between causes and background conditions. Suppose that an arsonist lit a match,
oxygen was present in the air, and a fire occurred. The fire counterfactually depends upon both the match
and the oxygen, but we tend to consider only the match as the cause of the fire, viewing the oxygen as
a mere background condition. By regarding a world with oxygen and no match as more normal than a
world with a lit match and no oxygen, we can treat this case in a way that is formally analogous to the
treatment of pen vignette. Halpern and Hitchcock (2011) provide a number of further illustrations.
Some will worry that this account of actual causation will make causation subjective. While we
agree that this introduces a subjective element to actual causation, we do not view this as a concern. The
causal model represents the objective core of causation. The patterns of causal dependence represented
by the equations of a causal model are objective features of the world. Actual causation is a further
relation that goes beyond these objective dependence relations. It is determined in part by objective
relations of causal dependence, but it is also determined in part by considerations of normality.
5If a potential cause has multiple witnesses, it is graded according to its most normal witness(es).
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2.3 Extended Causal Models
Following our earlier work (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2011), we formalize normality using extended causal
models. We assume that there is a partial preorder  over worlds; s  s′ means that world s is at least
as normal as world s′. The fact that  is a partial preorder means that it is reflexive (for all worlds s,
we have s  s, so s is at least as normal as itself) and transitive (if s is at least as normal as s′ and s′ is
at least as normal as s′′, then s is at least as normal as s′′).6 We write s  s′ if s  s′ and it is not the
case that s′  s, and s ≡ s′ if s  s′ and s′  s. Thus, s  s′ means that s is strictly more normal than
s′, while s ≡ s′ means that s and s′ are equally normal. Note that we are not assuming that  is total;
it is quite possible that there are two worlds s and s′ that are incomparable as far as normality. The fact
that s and s′ are incomparable does not mean that s and s′ are equally normal. We can interpret it as
saying that the agent is not prepared to declare either s or s′ as more normal than the other, and also not
prepared to say that they are equally normal; they simply cannot be compared in terms of normality. An
extended causal model is a tuple M = (S,F ,), where (S,F) is a causal model, and  is a partial
preorder on worlds, which can be used to compare how normal different worlds are.
Partial preorders are essentially used by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor (1990) and Shoham (1987)
to model normality. Many other approaches to modeling normality have been proposed in the litera-
ture, including -semantics (Adams, 1975; Geffner, 1992; Pearl, 1989), possibility measures (Dubois
& Prade, 1991), and ranking functions (Goldszmidt & Pearl, 1992; Spohn, 1988). Perhaps the most
general approach uses what are called plausibility measures (Friedman & Halpern, 1995, 2001); we
return to plausibility measures below. Some of these approaches (specifically, -semantics, possibilistic
structures, and ranking functions) essentially impose a total order on worlds; as we shall see, the greater
generality of partial orders provides a useful modeling tool. That said, almost all of what we are say in
this paper applies to all these other approaches as well.
3 Compact Representations of Extended Models
In (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2011), a formal definition of actual causality is given; the definition is given
relative to an extended causal model. In order to determine actual causation according to this definition,
an agent would have to have a representation of the model. As we suggested in the introduction, a naı¨ve
representation of a model involving n binary random variables would involve n2n−1 values, since for
each variable Xi, the function FXi has to give the value of Xi for each of the 2
n−1 settings of the other
variables. Even if we restrict attention to acyclic models, there may be one variable X that depends
on all the others, so that the function FX corresponding to X has to give a value to X for each of the
2n−1 settings of the other variables. Moreover, we must still define a partial preorder of the 2n worlds.
Even if we restrict to total orders or use one of the other representations of normality, since there are
2n! ∼ 2n2n total orders of the worlds, this requires at least n2n bits of information. Nevertheless, as we
now show, in practice, it will often be possible to represent this information in a far more compact way.
6Ifwere a partial order rather than just a partial preorder, it would satisfy an additional assumption, antisymmetry: s  s′
and s′  s would have to imply s = s′. This is an assumption we do not want to make.
8
3.1 Representing causal equations compactly: the big picture
As we mentioned in the introduction, the key tool for getting compact representations is the use of
graphical representations. It is sometimes helpful to represent a causal model graphically. Each node in
the graph corresponds to one variable in the model. An arrow from one node, say L, to another, say FF ,
indicates that the former variable figures as a nontrivial argument in the equation for the latter—that
is, the latter depends on the former. Thus, we could represent either the conjunctive or the disjunctive
model of the forest-fire example using Figure 1. Note that the graph conveys only the qualitative pattern
of dependence; it does not tell us how one variable depends on others. Thus, the graph alone does not
allow us to distinguish between the disjunctive and the conjunctive models.
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Figure 1: A graphical representation of structural equations.
The semantics (i.e., meaning) of such a graphical representation depends on how it is being used.
In the case of causal models, it is particularly simple. The value of a variable in a graph depends only
on the values of its parents and is independent of the values of all other variables once the values of its
parents are given. Thus, in the forest-fire example, when we write the equation for FF , it depends only
on the value of L and M , and not on the value of U . (Of course, the values of L and M depend on the
value of U , so indirectly the value of FF depends on the value of U .) Formally, this means that FFF
needs to take only two arguments (the value of L and the value of M ), rather than 3. More generally,
if each variable in a graph with n nodes has at most k parents, we can describe the equations using n2k
values. If k is small relative to n (as it is in many cases), this can be considerably less than n2n−1, and
thus be computationally feasible.
It is not always the case that all nodes have few parents. Consider the voting example. In that case,
the outcome depends on how all the voters vote; that is, all of V1, . . . , V11 are parents of W . Thus, in
order to describe how W depends upon the other variables, we must specify the outcome for each of
the 211 ways that the voters could vote. But we can do this simply without needing to list 211 separate
values: we simply say that W = 1 iff V1+ · · ·+V11 ≥ 6. In the forest-fire example, we can replace the
explicit description of the value of FF in terms of the four possible settings of L and M by just writing
FF = max(L,M ) or FF = min(L,M ), depending on whether we are considering the disjunctive or
conjunctive model. There are times when the best we can do is to write out the explicit description of a
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function. But in most cases of interest, there will be a much more compact description. The bottom line
here is we expect to be able to represent the structural equations compactly in most cases of interest.
3.2 Representing the normality relation compactly: the big picture
We can also make use of a graphical representation to represent the normality order compactly. It is
well known that Bayesian networks can provide a compact representation for a probability distribution.
Suppose that we have a set V = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn} of variables. The worlds determined by these
variables are those of the form (x1, . . . , xn), where xi is a possible value of Xi. If we have n binary
variables, and thus 2n possible worlds, we need 2n numbers to describe a probability distribution on
these worlds. (Actually, we need only 2n − 1, since the sum of the numbers must be 1.) A quantitative
Bayesian network on a set V = {X1, . . . , Xn} is an ordered pair (G, f), whereG is a Bayesian network,
that is, a directed acyclic graph, with n nodes, each labeled by a different variable in V , and f associates
with each variable Xi in V a conditional probability table (cpt) for Xi, which describes the probability
that Xi = 1 conditional on all the possible settings of its parents in G. For example, if the parents of
Xi are Xj , Xk, and Xl, then we must know the probability that Xi = 1 conditional on each of the
eight possible settings of Xj , Xk, and Xl. A probability measure Pr on the worlds determined by the
variables in V is represented by (G, f) if (a)G satisfies the Markov condition, namely, that each variable
Xi is independent of its nondescendants conditional on its parents;7 and (b) the cpt f(Xi) correctly
describes the probability (according to Pr) of Xi conditional on all possible values of its parents. If
(G, f) represents Pr, then we can recover Pr from (G, f) using quite straightforward computations
(see (Halpern, 2003; Pearl, 1988)).
Given a probability distribution Pr, it is always possible to find a quantitative Bayesian network
(G, f) that represents it. Morever, if each node in G has at most k parents, then we need at most
(2k − 1)n numbers to descibe (G, f), since each cpt requires at most 2k − 1 numbers.
Our representation of normality does not use probabilities; rather, it uses a partial preorder on
worlds. However, as pointed out by Halpern (2001), the “technology” of Bayesian networks can be
applied to mathematical structures other than probability. We just need a structure that has a number of
minimal properties and has an analogue of (conditional) independence (so that we can have an analogue
of the Markov condition). Results of Friedman and Halpern (2001) show that a partial order on worlds
gives us just such a structure. Moreover, other representations of normality that have been considered
in the literature (e.g., ranking functions and possibility measures) also have such a structure, so can also
be represented using Bayesian networks. In the language of Friedman and Halpern (1995; 2001), a suf-
ficient condition for a representation of uncertainty to be represented using Bayesian network is that it
can be viewed as an algebraic conditional plausibility measure. We briefly review some of the relevant
details here.
Plausibility measures, introduced by Friedman and Halpern (1995; 2001), are intended to be a gen-
eralization of all standard approaches to representing uncertainty. The basic idea behind plausibility
measures is straightforward. A probability measure on a finite set W of worlds maps subsets of W to
[0, 1]. A plausibility measure is more general; it maps subsets of W to some arbitrary set D partially
7Y is a descendant of X if there is a directed path from X to Y , where we take X to be a descendant of itself. Y is a
nondescendant of X if it is not a descendant of X . We assume that the reader is familiar with the notion of a random variable
Y being independent of another random variable X conditional on a set Z of random variables. See (Halpern, 2003; Pearl,
1988) for more discussion.
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ordered by ≤. If Pl is a plausibility measure, Pl(U) denotes the plausibility of U . If Pl(U) ≤ Pl(V ),
then V is at least as plausible as U . Because the order is partial, it could be that the plausibility of two
different sets is incomparable. An agent may not be prepared to order two sets in terms of plausibility.
D is assumed to contain two special elements, ⊥ and >, such that ⊥ ≤ d ≤ > for all d ∈ D. We
require that Pl(∅) = ⊥ and Pl(W ) = >. Thus,⊥ and> are the analogues of 0 and 1 for probability. We
further require that if U ⊆ V , then Pl(U) ≤ Pl(V ). This seems reasonable; a superset of U should be at
least as plausible as U . Since Bayesian networks make such heavy use of conditioning, we need to deal
with conditional plausibility measures (cpms), not just plausibility measures. A conditional plausibility
measure maps pairs of subsets of W to some partially ordered set D. We write Pl(U | V ) rather than
Pl(U, V ), in keeping with standard notation for conditioning. We typically write just Pl(U) rather than
Pl(U |W ) (so unconditional plausibility is identified with conditioning on the whole space).
In the case of a probability measure Pr, it is standard to take Pr(U | V ) to be undefined if Pr(V ) =
0. In general, we must make precise what the allowable second arguments of a cpm are. For simplicity
here, we assume that Pl(U | V ) is defined as long as V 6= ∅. For each fixed V 6= ∅, Pl(· | V ) is required
to be a plausibility measure on W . More generally, we require the following properties:
CPl1. Pl(∅ | V ) = ⊥.
CPl2. Pl(W | V ) = >.
CPl3. If U ⊆ U ′, then Pl(U | V ) ≤ Pl(U ′ | V ).
CPl4. Pl(U | V ) = Pl(U ∩ V | V ).
Conditional probability satisfies additional properties; for example, Pr(U | V ′) = Pr(U | V ) ×
Pr(V | V ′) if U ⊆ V ⊆ V ′ and V 6= ∅, and Pr(V1 ∪ V2 | V ) = Pr(V1 | V ) + Pr(V2 | V ) if V1 and
V2 are disjoint sets. These properties turn out to play a critical role in carrying out the reasoning used
in Bayesian networks. We want plausibilistic analogues of them. This requires us to have plausibilistic
analogues of addition and multiplication, so that we can take Pl(V1∪V2 | V3) = Pl(V1 | V3)⊕Pl(V2 | V3)
if V1 and V2 are disjoint, and Pl(V1 | V3) = Pl(V1 | V2) ⊗ Pl(V2 | V3) if V1 ⊆ V2 ⊆ V3. We give the
formal definitions in the next section. For now, we just note that these properties hold for probability
if we take ⊕ and ⊗ to be + and × respectively; and they hold for ranking functions if we take ⊕ and
⊗ to be min and +. They also hold for possibility measures, although the situation is somewhat more
complicated there (see (Halpern, 2001)).
We want to view a partial preorder on worlds as an algebraic conditional plausibility measure. There
is a problem though. A plausibility measure attaches a plausibility to sets of worlds, not single worlds.
So, given a partial preorder  on worlds, we must first find a plausibility measure Pl with the property
that Pl(w1) ≥ Pl(w2) iff w1  w2. We then need to show how we can extend this plausibility
measure to an algebraic conditional plausibility measure. We do this in the next section.
We are mainly interested in algebraic plausibility measures on a set of worlds determined by random
variables X1, . . . , Xn. By results of (Halpern, 2001), such plausibility measures can be represented
using a plausibilistic Bayesian network (G, f), where G is a Bayesian network and f associates with
each node Xi in G a conditional plausibility table; we abuse notation and use the abbreviation cpt for
a conditional plausibility table as well. The cpt for X specifies the plausibility of each possible value
of X , conditional on all possible values of X’s parents. (Note that if X is binary, it no longer suffices
to just specify the plausibility of X = 1 conditional on X’s parents, because the plausibility of X = 1
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does not necessarily determine the plausibility of X = 0 conditional on X’s parents.) We can define
what it means for a plausibilistic Bayesian network to represent a plausiblity measure just as in the
probabilistic case. And, just as in the probabilistic case, a plausibility measure that takes values in an
algebraic cpm can be represented by plausibilistic Bayesian network. Moreover, if each node in the
network has relatively few parents, we have a compact representation of the plausibility measure. The
bottom line here is that, once we show how to represent a partial preorder as an algebraic plausibility
measure, we can get a representation of the preorder using Bayesian networks that will typically be
compact.
In addition to representing the Bayesian network, if we use a plausibility measure, we must also
represent the plausibility domain; that is, we have to describe its elements and the ordering on them. We
expect that, typically, the domain will be relatively small, and the ordering easy to describe. Indeed, here
the fact that we allow partial orders makes it easier, because we allow many elements to be incomparable.
This will become clearer in the examples in Section 3.4.
3.3 Representing the normality relation compactly: the technical details
In this section, we fill in the technical details for the results discussed in the previous section. This
section can be skipped without loss of continuity. We start with the formal definition of algebraic
conditional plausibility measures.
Definition 3.1: An algebraic conditional plausibility measure Pl on W maps pairs of subsets of W
to a domain D that is endowed with operations ⊕ and ⊗, defined on domains Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗),
respectively, such that the following properties hold:
Alg1. If V1 and V2 are disjoint subsets ofW and V 6= ∅, then Pl(V1∪V2 | V ) = Pl(V1 | V )⊕Pl(V2 | V ).
Alg2. If U ⊆ V ⊆ V ′ and V 6= ∅, then Pl(U | V ′) = Pl(U | V )⊗ Pl(V | V ′).
Alg3. ⊗ distributes over ⊕; more precisely, a ⊗ (b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn) = (a ⊗ b1) ⊕ · · · ⊕ (a ⊗ bn) if
(a, b1), . . . , (a, bn), (a, b1⊕· · ·⊕bn) ∈ Dom(⊗) and (b1, . . . , bn), (a⊗b1, . . . , a⊗bn) ∈ Dom(⊕),
where Dom(⊕) = {(Pl(V1 | U), . . . ,Pl(Vn | U)) : V1, . . . , Vn are pairwise disjoint and U 6= ∅},
and Dom(⊗) = {(Pl(U | V ),Pl(V | V ′)) : U ⊆ V ⊆ V ′, V 6= ∅}. (The reason that this property
is required only for tuples in Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗) is discussed shortly. Note that parentheses are
not required in the expression b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn although, in general, ⊕ need not be associative. This
is because it follows immediately from Alg1 that ⊕ is associative and commutative on tuples in
Dom(⊕).)
Alg4. If (a, c), (b, c) ∈ Dom(⊗), a⊗ c ≤ b⊗ c, and c 6= ⊥, then a ≤ b.
The restrictions in Alg3 and Alg4 to tuples in Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗) make these conditions a little more
awkward to state. It may seem more natural to consider a stronger version of, say, Alg4 that applies to
all pairs in D ×D. Roughly speaking, Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗) are the only tuples where we really care
how ⊕ and ⊗ work. We use ⊕ to determine the (conditional) plausibility of the union of two disjoint
sets. Thus, we care about Pl(V1 | V ) and Pl(V2 | V ), respectively, where V1 and V2 are disjoint sets, in
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which case we want a ⊕ b to be Pl(V1 ∪ V2 | V ). More generally, we care about a1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ an only if
ai has the form Pl(Vi | V ), where V1, . . . , Vn are pairwise disjoint. Dom(⊕) consists of precisely these
tuples of plausibility values. Similarly, we care about a ⊗ b only if a and b have the form Pl(U1 | U2)
and Pl(U2 | U3), respectively, where U1 ⊆ U2 ⊆ U3, in which case we want a ⊗ b to be Pl(U1 | U3).
Dom(⊗) consists of precisely these pairs (a, b). By requiring that Alg3 and Alg4 hold only for tuples in
Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗) rather than on all tuples in D ×D, some cpms of interest become algebraic that
would otherwise not be. (See (Halpern, 2001, 2003) for examples.) Restricting⊕ and⊗ to Dom(⊕) and
Dom(⊗) will also make it easier for us to view a partial preorder as an algebraic plausibility measure.
Since ⊕ and ⊗ are significant mainly to the extent that Alg1 and Alg2 hold, and Alg1 and Alg2 apply
to tuples in Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗), respectively, it does not seem unreasonable that properties like Alg3
and Alg4 be required to hold only for these tuples.
In an algebraic cpm, we can define a set U to be plausibilistically independent of V conditional on
V ′ if V ∩ V ′ 6= ∅ implies that Pl(U | V ∩ V ′) = Pl(U | V ′). The intuition here is that learning V does
not affect the conditional plausibility of U given V ′. Note that conditional independence is, in general,
asymmetric. U can be conditionally independent of V without V being conditionally independent of U .
Although this may not look like the standard definition of probabilistic conditional independence, it is
not hard to show that this definition agrees with the standard definition (that Pr(U ∩ V | V ′) = Pr(U |
V ′)×Pr(V | V ′)) in the special case that the plausibility measure is actually a probability measure (see
(Halpern, 2001) for further discussion of this issue). Of course, in this case, the definition is symmetric.
The next step is to show how to represent a partial preorder on worlds as an algebraic plausibility
measure. We do so using ideas of (Friedman & Halpern, 2001).
Suppose that we have an extended causal model M = (S,F ,). We proceed as follows. Define
a preoder + on subsets of W by taking U + V if, for all w ∈ V , there exists some w′ ∈ U such
that w′  w. It is easy to check that w  w′ iff {w} + {w′}. Thus, we have a partial preorder on
sets that extends the partial preorder on worlds. We might consider getting an unconditional plausibility
measure Pl that extends the partial preorder on worlds by taking the range of Pl to be subsets of W ,
and defining Pl as the identity; that is, taking Pl(U) = U , and taking U ≥ V iff U  V .
This almosts works. There is a subtle problem though. The relation ≥ used in plausibility measures
must be an order, not a preorder. For an order ≥ on a set X , if x ≥ x′ and x′ ≥ x, we must have
x′ = x. Thus, for example, if w  w′ and w′  w, then we want Pl({w}) = Pl({w′}). This is easily
arranged.
Define U ≡ V if U + V and V + U . Let [U ] = {U ′ ⊆ W : U ′ ≡ U}. Now if we take
Pl(U) = [U ], and take [U ] ≥ [V ] if U ′  V ′ for some U ′ ∈ [U ] and V ′ ∈ [V ], then it is easy to check
that ≥ is well defined (since if U ′  V ′ for some U ′ ∈ [U ] and V ′ ∈ [V ], then U ′  V ′ for all U ′ ∈ [U ]
and V ′ ∈ [V ]) and is a partial order.
While this gives us an unconditional plausibility measure extending , we are not quite there yet.
We need a conditional plausibility measure, and a definition of⊕ and⊗. Note that if U1, U2 ∈ [U ], then
U1 ∪ U2 ∈ [U ]. Since W is finite, it follows that each set [U ] has a largest element, namely, the union
of the sets in [U ].
Let D be the domain consisting of ⊥, >, and all elements of the form d[U ]|[V ] for all [U ] and [V ]
such that the largest element in [U ] is a strict subset of the largest element in [V ]. We place an ordering
≥ on D by taking ⊥ < d[U ]|[V ] < > and d[U ]|[V ] ≤ d[U ′]|[V ′] if [V ] = [V ′] and U ′ + U . We view D as
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the range of an algebraic plausibility measure, defined by taking
Pl(U | V ) =

⊥ if U ∩ V = ∅
> if U ∩ V = V
d[U∩V ]|[V ] otherwise.
We can define ⊕ and ⊗ on D so that Alg1 and Alg2 hold. This is easy to do, in large part because we
only need to define ⊕ and ⊗ on Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗), where the definitions are immediate because
of the need to satisfy Alg1 and Alg2. It is easy to see that these conditions and the definition of Pl
guarantee that Pl1–4 hold. With a little more work, it can be shown that these conditions imply Alg3
and Alg4 as well. (Here the fact that Alg3 and Alg4 are restricted to Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗) turns out to
be critical; it is also important that U ≡ V implies that U ≡ U ∪ V .)
This construction gives us an algebraic cpm, so the results of (Halpern, 2001) apply. Specifically,
we can represent  using a Bayesian network (G, f). The structure of G is determined by the indepen-
dencies exhibited by the normality order on worlds. There is no guarantee that G will be the same as
the graph that represents the causal structure. In many cases, however, there will be substantial overlap
between the Bayesian network representation of the normality order and the causal model. As we show
in Section 4 below, when this occurs, even greater economy is possible.
3.4 Using a compact representation to determine a normality order
The discussion above shows that if we start with an algebraic conditional plausibility measure deter-
mined by a normality order on worlds, then we can represent it using a Bayesian network. Moreover,
this representation will often be compact. But what we really want is more like the converse. Suppose
that we are given a quantitative Bayesian network. Can we use that to determine a normality order on
worlds? The reason that we are particularly interested in this question is that, in many cases of interest,
it is quite natural to characterize a situation using a quantitative Bayesian network.
Suppose, for example, that a lawyer is arguing that a defendant should be convicted of arson. The
lawyer will attempt to establish a claim of actual causation: that the defendant’s action of lighting a
match was an actual cause of the forest fire. To do this, she will need to convince the jury that a certain
extended causal model is correct, and that certain initial conditions obtained (for example, that the
defendant did indeed light a match). To justify a causal model, she will need to defend the equations.
This might involve convincing the jury that the defendant’s match was the sort of thing that could cause
a forest fire (the wood was dry), and that there would have been no fire in the absence of some triggering
event, such as a lightning strike or an act of arson.
The lawyer will also have to defend a normality ordering. To do this, she might argue that a lightning
strike could not have been reasonably foreseen; that lighting a fire in the forest at that time of year was
in violation of a statute; and that it was to be expected that a forest fire would result from such an act.
The key idea here is that it will usually be easier to justify a normality ordering in a piecemeal fashion.
Instead of arguing for a particular normality ordering on entire worlds, she argues that individual vari-
ables typically take certain values in certain situations.8 In doing this, she is defending a particular cpt
8Here and subsequently we make use of an artificial terminological convention introduced in (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2011).
We use “typical” and its cognates when talking about individual variables. For example, we say that it is atypical for lightning
to strike. We reserve “normal” and its cognates for comparisons of entire worlds. Formally, however, both are represented by
plausibility values.
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for each variable. What we show in this section is that having a cpt for each variable leads in a natural
way to a particular choice of normality ordering on worlds.
Recall that the Bayesian network G is labeled by variables X1, . . . , Xn; we want to define a nor-
mality order on worlds of the form (x1, . . . , xn), where xi is a possible value of the random variable
Xi. We will associate with each such world a plausibility value of the form a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ an, where ai is
a value in the cpt for Xi. For example, if n = 3, and, according to G, X1 and X2 are independent and
X3 depends on both X1 and X2, then a world (1, 0, 1) would be assigned a plausibility of a1⊗ a2⊗ a3,
where a1 is the unconditional plausibility of X1 = 1 according to the cpt for X1, a2 is the unconditional
plausibility of X2 = 0 according to the cpt for X2, and a3 is the plausibility of X3 = 1 conditional on
X1 = 1 ∩ X2 = 0, given by the cpt for X3. We do not need to actually define the operation ⊗ here;
we just leave a1 ⊗ a2 ⊗ a3 as an uninterpreted expression. However, if we have some constraints on
the relative order of elements in the cpt (as we do in our examples, and typically will in practice), then
lift this to an order on expressions of the form a1 ⊗ a2 ⊗ a3 by taking a1 ⊗ a2 ⊗ a3 ≤ a′1 ⊗ a′2 ⊗ a′3
if and only if, for all ai, there exists some a′j such that ai ≤ a′j . The “only if” builds in a minimality
assumption: two elements a1 ⊗ a2 ⊗ a3 and a′1 ⊗ a′2 ⊗ a′3 are incomparable unless they are forced to
be comparable by the ordering relations among the ai’s and the a′j’s. One advantage of using a partial
preorder, rather than a total preorder, is that we can do this.
These assumptions determine a unique partial preorder on elements of the form a1⊗ · · · ⊗ an. This
gives us a partial preorder on worlds. (We can then use the construction in Section 3.3 to then obtain an
algebraic plausibility measure that in fact represented by (G, f), but this is no longer necessary, since
all we care about is the normality order on worlds.)
While the formal foundations of our approach involve some complexities, the application of these
ideas to specific cases is often quite intuitive. The following two examples show how this construction
might work in our running example.
Example 3.2: Consider the forest-fire example again. Here we can take the worlds to have the form
(i, j, k) where i, j, and k are the values of M , L, and FF , respectively. We can represent the indepen-
dencies in the forest-fire example using the network in Figure 1 (with U removed). Thus, L and M are
independent, and FF depends on both of them.
For definiteness, consider the disjunctive case, where either a lightning strike or an arsonist’s match
suffices for fire. It would be natural to say that lightning strikes and arson attacks are atypical, and that
a forest fire typically occurs if either of these events occurs. Suppose that we use d+L to represent the
plausibility of L = 0 (lightning not occuring) and d−L to represent the plausibiltiy of L = 1; similarly,
we use d+M to represent the plausibility of M = 0 and d
−
M to represent the plausibility of M = 1. Now
the question is what we should take the conditional plausibility of FF = 0 and FF = 1 to be given
each of the four possible settings of L and M . For simplicity, we take all the four values compatible
with the equations to be equally plausible, and have plausibility d+FF , and the values incompatiable with
the equations to all be equally plausible and have plausibility d−FF . This gives us the following cpts:
Pl(L = 0) = d+L > d
−
L = Pl(L = 1)
Pl(M = 0) = d+M > d
−
M = Pl(M = 1)
Pl(FF = 0 | L = 0 ∧M = 0) = d+FF > d−FF = Pl(FF = 1 | L = 0 ∧M = 0)
Pl(FF = 1 | L = 1 ∧M = 0) = d+FF > d−FF = Pl(FF = 0 | L = 1 ∧M = 0)
Pl(FF = 1 | L = 0 ∧M = 1) = d+FF > d−FF = Pl(FF = 0 | L = 0 ∧M = 1)
Pl(FF = 1 | L = 1 ∧M = 1) = d+FF > d−FF = Pl(FF = 0 | L = 1 ∧M = 1).
(1)
15
Suppose that we further assume that d+L , d
+
M , and d
+
FF are all incomparable, as are d
−
L , d
−
M , and d
−
FF .
Thus, for example, we cannot compare the degree of typicality of no lightning with that of no arson
attacks, or the degree of atypicality of lightning with that of an arson attack. Using the construction
above gives us the the ordering on worlds given in Figure 2, where an arrow from w to w′ indicates that
w′  w.
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Figure 2: A normality order on worlds.
In this normality order, (0, 1, 1) is more normal than (1, 1, 1) and (0, 1, 0), but incomparable with (1,
0, 0) and (0, 0, 1). That is because, according to our construction, (0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0),
and (0, 0, 1) have plausibility d+L ⊗ d−M ⊗ d+FF , d−L ⊗ d−M ⊗ d+FF , d+L ⊗ d−M ⊗ d+FF , d−L ⊗ d+M ⊗ d−FF , and
d+L ⊗d+M ⊗d+FF , respectively. The fact that d+L ⊗d−M ⊗d+FF ≥ d−L ⊗d−M ⊗d+FF follows since d+L ≥ d−L .
The fact that we have >, not just ≥, follows from the fact that we do not have d−L ⊗ d−M ⊗ d+FF ≥
d+L⊗d−M⊗d+FF , since this does not follow from our condition from comparability. The other comparisons
follow from similar arguments.
Example 3.3: The order on worlds induced by the Bayesian network in the previous example treats the
lightning and the arsonist’s actions as incomparable. For example, the world (1, 0, 1), where lightning
strikes, the arsonist doesn’t, and there is a fire, is incomparable with the world where lightning doesn’t
strike, the arsonist lights his match, and the fire occurs. But this is not the only possibility. Suppose that
we judge that it would be more atypical for the arsonist to light a fire than for lightning to strike, and
also more typical for the arsonist not to light a fire than for lightning not to strike. (Unlike the case of
probability, the latter does not follow from the former.) Recall that this order might reflect the fact that
arson is illegal and immoral, rather than the frequency of occurrence of arson as opposed to lightning.
While (1) still describes the conditional plausibility tables, we now have d+L > d
+
M and d
−
M > d
−
L . This
gives us the order on worlds described in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: A different normality order on worlds.
Now, for example, the world (0, 1, 1) is strictly more normal than the world (1, 0, 1); again, the
former has plausibility d+L ⊗ d−M ⊗ d+FF , while the latter has plausibility d−L ⊗ d+M ⊗ d+FF . But since
d+L > d
−
L and d
+
L > d
+
M , by assumption, it follows that d
+
L ⊗ d−M ⊗ d+FF > d−L ⊗ d+M ⊗ d+FF .
4 Piggy-Backing on the Causal Model
If the normality order is represented by a Bayesian network (G, f), there is no guarantee that the graph
G will duplicate the graph corresponding to the causal model. Nonetheless, in many cases it will be
reasonable to expect that there will be substantial agreement between the two graphs. When this hap-
pens, it will be possible to make parts of the causal model do “double duty”: representing both causal
structure, and the structure of the normality order. In Examples 3.2 and 3.3, the graph describing the
causal structure is the same as the graph in the Bayesian network representation of the normality order.
This reflects the idea that a fire typically occurs when causes of a fire are present.
But we can say more than this. Consider the conditional plausibility table for the variable FF from
(1). We can summarize it as follows:
Pl(FF = ff | L = l ∧M = m) =
{
dFF+ if ff = max(l,m)
dFF− otherwise.
Recall that FF = max(L,M ) is the structural equation for FF in the causal model. So the conditional
plausibility table says, in effect, that it is typical for FF to obey the structural equations, and atypical to
violate it.
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Variables typically obey the structural equations. Thus, it is often far more efficient to assume this
holds by default, and explicitly enumerate cases where this is not so, rather than writing out all the
equations. Specifically, we propose the following default rule.
Default Rule 1 (Normal Causality): Let X be a variable in a causal model with no exoge-
nous parents, and let PA(X) be the vector of parents of X . Let the structural equation for
X beX = fX(PA(X)). Then, unless explicitly given otherwise, there are two plausibility
values d+X and d
−
X with d
+
X > d
−
X such that
Pl(X = x | PA(X) = pX) =
{
dX+ if x = fX(pX)
dX− otherwise.
Default Rule 1 tells us that it is typical for variables to satisfy the equations, unless we explicitly stipulate
otherwise. In Examples 3.2 and 3.3, FF satisfies Default Rule 1. Moreover, it says that, by default,
all values of variables that satisfy the equations are equally typical, while all those that do not satisfy
the equations are equally atypical. Of course, we could allow some deviations from the equations to be
more atypical than others; this would be a violation of the default rule. As the name suggests, the default
rule is to be assumed, unless explicitly stated otherwise. The hope is that there will be relatively few
violations, so there is still substantial representational economy in assuming the rule. That is, the hope
is that, once a causal model is given, the normality order can be represented efficiently by providing the
conditional plausibility tables for only those variables that violate the default rule, or whose plausibility
values are not determined by the default rule (because they have exogenous parents).9
The Normal Causality rule, by itself, does not tell us how the plausibility values in the cpt for one
variable compare to the plausibility values in the cpt for another variable. We therefore supplement our
first default rule with a second:
Default Rule 2 (Minimality): If dx and dy are plausibility values in the conditional plausi-
bility table for distinct variables X and Y and no information is given explicitly regarding
the relative orders of dx and dy, then dx and dy are incomparable.
Again, this default rule is assumed to hold only if there is no explicit stipulation to the contrary. Default
Rule 2 tells us that the normality ordering among possible worlds should not include any comparisons
that do not follow from the equations (via Default Rule 1) together with the information that is explicitly
given.10 In Example 3.2, all three variables satisfy Minimality. In Example 3.3, FF satisifies Minimality
with respect to the other two variables, but the variables L and M do not satisfy it with respect to one
another (since their values are stipulated to be comparable).
With these two default rules, we can represent the extended causal model in Example 3.2 succinctly
as follows:
FF = max(L,M )
Pl(L = 0) > Pl(L = 1)
Pl(M = 0) > Pl(M = 1).
9It may be possible to formulate more complex versions of Default Rule 1 that accommodate exogenous parents, and allow
for more than two default values. We leave these extensions for another occasion.
10 Roughly speaking, in the context of probability, a distribution that maximizes entropy subject to some constraints is one
that is (very roughly) the one that makes things “as equal as possible” subject to the constraints. If there are no constraints, it
reduces to the classic principle of indifference, which tells us to assign equal probability to different possibilities in the absence
of any reason to think some are more probable. In the context of plausibility, where only weak order is assigned, it is possible
to push this idea a step further by making the possibilities incomparable.
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The rest of the structure of the normality order follows from the default rules.
In Example 3.3, we can represent the extended causal model as follows:
FF = max(L,M )
Pl(M = 0) > Pl(L = 0) > Pl(L = 1) > Pl(M = 1).
Again, the rest of the structure follows from the default rules. In each case, the normality order among
the eight possible worlds can be represented with the addition of just a few plausibility values to the
causal model. Thus, moving from a causal model to an extended causal model need not impose enor-
mous cognitive demands.
Exceptions to the default rules can come in many forms. There could be values of the variables
for which violations of the equations are more typical than agreements with the equations. As we we
suggested after Default Rule 1, there could be multiple values of typicality, rather than just two for each
variable.11 Or the conditional plausibility values of one variable could be comparable with those of
another variable. These default rules are useful to the extent that there are relatively few violations of
them. For some settings, other default rules may also be useful; the two rules we have presented are
certainly not the only possible useful defaults.
5 Nothing but Normality?
In a recent paper, Huber (2011) claimed that it is unnecessary to employ distinct modalities for nor-
mality and causal structure, and that it is preferable to encompass both in a unified normality structure.
Huber’s framework employs a family of ranking functions to represent normality. Huber shows that if
the ranking functions satisfy a condition that he calls “respect for the equations”, one can use the rank-
ing functions as a “similarity metric” on possible worlds, and give a semantics for counterfactuals in the
spirit of Stalnaker68 (1968) or Lewis (1973). In this way, all the information about counterfactuals is
already contained in the ranking functions; it is unnecessary to give the structural equations as a distinct
element of the model. Moreover, this semantics provides truth values for propositions in a richer lan-
guage than that of Galles and Pearl (?), Halpern (2000), or Briggs (2012). In particular, it yields truth
values for embedded counterfactuals, where the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional includes a
counterfactual.
Huber’s requirement that the ranking functions respect the equations is similar in spirit to the Normal
Causality default rule, in that it requires worlds that violate more equations to receive higher rank.
(Higher rank corresponds to lower plausibility.) It is a bit more complicated than this, since it also gives
priority to worlds where violations occur “later”, as measured by number of steps in a directed path.
This is supposed to ensure that the closest possible world to w in which some variable X takes a value
x different from the one it takes in w, is one where X takes the value x due to a “miracle” that occurs
as late as possible.
We do not go into all of the details of Huber’s result here. It is easy to see that if there is a plausibility
measure that satisfies Normal Causality or something similar, then there is a natural sense in which the
11Note that there are many structural equations for a variable X . Indeed, if X has k parents, there are 2k equations, one for
each possible setting of the values of the parents of X . An equation like FF = max(L,M ) packages up the four equations
into one compact equation. Default Rule 1 assumes that all agreements with these 2k equations get a plausibility of d+X , and
all violations get a plausibility of d−X . But we could certainly view some violations as less typical than others.
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structural equations are encoded in that plausibility measure. Huber’s result is one specific way of
making of this idea precise.
Huber’s result is both interesting and technically impressive. Nonetheless, we prefer to retain causal
structure and a normality order as distinct modalities. We have this preference for several reasons.
First, while Huber’s result provides a kind of conceptual unification, it is not at all clear that it
provides a more compact representation. Indeed, as we have argued, it is often possible to provide a
representation of the causal structure plus the normality ordering that is very compact.
Second, we think that the normality ordering and the causal model are conceptually representing
very different things. The causal structure, as represented in the equations of a causal model, is an ob-
jective feature of a system. For example, the accuracy of a causal model can be evaluated by performing
appropriate observations and interventions on the system. By contrast, normality can be affected by
social rules, moral norms, and the like. The normality order may reflect features of the way in which an
agent reasons about a system, but it is not something that can be confirmed experimentally. We believe
that actual causation involves both of these components; it is partly objective and partly value-laden.
Our framework keeps these two distinct components separate and makes explicit the different roles they
play in judgments of actual causation.
Finally, there are examples where normality and causal structure do and should come apart. Huber
briefly discusses this point at the very end of his paper. He concludes that we should not rely on
mere intuitions about normality in cases such as these, but should instead put weight on the conceptual
economy and unification that results in his framework. As we now show, however, there are some
examples where the cleaving of normality and causal structure is justified not only by intuition, but also
by the demands of a theory of actual causation.
Recall Example 2.1, in which Professor Smith and the administrative assistant took the two remain-
ing pens. We had three endogenous variables: PS, representing whether or not Professor Smith takes
a pen; AA, representing whether or not the administrative assistant takes a pen; and PO representing
whether or not a problem occurs. To capture the judgments of the subject in the experiment, we want it
to be atypical for Professor Smith to take the pen (PO = 1). Let us now suppose that we add a further
variable to our model: CP = 1 if the department chair institutes a policy forbidding faculty members
from taking pens; CP = 0 if she does not institute such a policy. (We could add additional possible
values corresponding to alternative policies, such as forbidding everyone from taking pens, but this is
not essential to the present point.) How does the new variable CP relate to PS? On the one hand, it
seems that CP influences which value of PS is typical. When CP = 1, Professor Smith’s taking a pen
violates a norm. But it is also apparent that the chair’s policy had no effect on Professor Smith; he took
a pen despite the policy (let us assume that he willfully ignored the policy). Thus, we want our extended
model to say both that Professor Smith would take the pen if the chair implements the policy, and that
this violates a norm. We cannot do this if the same ordering is used for both normality and the structural
equations.
6 Conclusion
The goals of this paper are relatively modest. We highlight a problem that we believe has not been con-
sidered in the causality literature, and propose a solution to it. We believe that any reasonable approach
to causality must pass a minimal “psychological feasibility” test; the models must be representable com-
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pactly. We have shown that this can be done in practice with the Halpern-Pearl model, and with other
approaches that involve structural equations and possibly also a normality ordering. We believe that such
compactness considerations should be taken into account in any attempt to model human reasoning; far
too often in the philosophical literature, it has not been considered.
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